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ABSTRACT—Four experiments explored whether lacking
power impairs executive functioning, testing the hypothe-
sis that the cognitive presses of powerlessness increase
vulnerability to performance decrements during complex
executive tasks. In the first three experiments, low power
impaired performance on executive-function tasks: The
powerless were less effective than the powerful at updating
(Experiment 1), inhibiting (Experiment 2), and planning
(Experiment 3). Existing research suggests that the pow-
erless have difficulty distinguishing between what is goal
relevant and what is goal irrelevant in the environment. A
fourth experiment established that the executive-function
impairment associated with low power is driven by goal
neglect. The current research implies that the cognitive
alterations arising from powerlessness may help foster
stable social hierarchies and that empowering employees
may reduce costly organizational errors.
Societies are structured around social hierarchies, with some
individuals and groups achieving positions of power and domi-
nance over others (cf. Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). These
social orders are often rooted in immutable characteristics such
as race and sex, a situation that is unfair and ineffective because
talented members of disadvantaged groups are often prevented
from moving into positions of power. Many contemporary soci-
eties, in response to this injustice, have shifted from hierarchies
based on aristocracy to hierarchies based on meritocracy, with
high achievers fillingmore powerful positions than low achievers.
An implication of meritocracies is that individuals who lack
power are low achievers because they are less capable or less
motivated than those who acquire power. In this article, we
challenge this assumption. We propose that powerless people
often achieve less than powerful people because lacking power
itself fundamentally alters cognitive functioning and increases
vulnerability to performance decrements during complex ex-
ecutive tasks.
POWER AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
The powerless face a world of threats and uncertainty (Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). They must wait for instructions
before they can act (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003) and
must also attempt to discern the goals of the powerful. Even
when the powerless can act, they often cannot fully commit to
action, but must be prepared to change course if their superiors’
goals change. As a result, the powerless must constantly engage
in perspective taking (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld,
2006) and be especially attentive to their environment.
Existing research provides tentative evidence that low power
fundamentally alters an individual’s mental world. Low-power
individuals focus on the details at the expense of the ‘‘bigger
picture’’ (Smith & Trope, 2006). They are less cognitively flex-
ible than the powerful (Guinote, 2007a), attending to both pe-
ripheral and central attributes in the environment, and they fail
to distinguish between goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant fea-
tures of a stimulus (Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006). In addition,
low-power individuals from both human (Keltner et al., 2003)
and animal (Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 2006) populations tend
to be more vigilant than high-power individuals. Such height-
ened self- and other-monitoring impairs executive functions, as
demonstrated in research on the cognitive stress of interracial
interactions (Richeson & Shelton, 2003).
Because of these cognitive changes, the powerless may be less
successful than the powerful in performing difficult tasks, a
hypothesis that is consistent with research on stereotype threat
(Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Members of stigmatized
groups display worse self-control (Inzlicht, McKay, & Aronson,
2006) and decreased performance when their low status is made
salient, compared with when it is not, partially because of im-
paired working memory (Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007;
Schmader & Johns, 2003). Indeed, a neurophysiological corre-
late of low power (i.e., low levels of serotonin; Moskowitz, Pin-
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ard, Zuroff, Annable, & Young, 2001; Raleigh, McGuire, Bram-
mer, & Yuwiler, 1984) also correlates with worse performance
during complex tasks (Park et al., 1994).
We suggest that low power causes performance deficits be-
cause being powerless impairs executive functions. Executive
functions are general control mechanisms that coordinate cog-
nitive subprocesses. Executive functions include updating goal-
relevant information and inhibiting goal-irrelevant information
(cf. Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000).
These separate executive functions share an underlying com-
monality: the maintenance of goal-related information in working
memory despite interference and distraction (cf. Engle, 2002).
Thus, executive functions are necessary for the planning and exe-
cution of goal-directed behavior, and executive-function deficits
can cause individuals to lose their goal focus, a situation referred
to as goal neglect (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer,
1996; cf. Jostmann & Koole, 2007; Kane & Engle, 2003).
In the current research, we sought to test the hypothesis that
lack of power impairs executive functions. Two of the most
commonly proposed executive functions are updating and in-
hibiting, which, in turn, are necessary to perform more complex
cognitive tasks, like planning (Miyake et al., 2000). Thus, we
explored whether the powerless are less effective than the
powerful at updating (Experiment 1, which used a two-back
task) and inhibiting (Experiment 2, which used a Stroop task).
We also tested whether the powerless are less effective than the
powerful at planning (Experiment 3, which used a Tower of
Hanoi task). Finally, in Experiment 4, we examined goal neglect
among the powerless. Using variations of an inhibition task (i.e.,
Stroop) that have previously been employed to demonstrate goal
neglect (Jostmann & Koole, 2007; Kane & Engle, 2003), we
tested whether lacking power leads individuals to have difficulty
maintaining focus on their current goal.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 examined the effect of power on the executive
function of updating. Updating involves monitoring whether
information is relevant for a present goal: New information is
monitored for relevance, and relevant information replaces old,
irrelevant information in working memory. We used a two-back
task (Braver et al., 1997) because it requires participants to
update working memory constantly in order to respond accu-
rately. We predicted that low-power participants would make
more errors than high-power participants.
Method
Participants were 101 students from a Dutch university. They
received h3 for participating. Six participants were dropped
from analyses: 4 for having suspicions that the role manipulation
(see the next paragraph) was not real and 2 for extreme perfor-
mance (more than 3 standard deviations from the mean). Thus,
data from 95 participants (65 females, 30 males) were analyzed.
Using a procedure adapted from Richeson and Ambady
(2003), we assigned each participant to be either a superior or a
subordinate in a computer-based task. Participants were told
that the superior would direct and evaluate the subordinate. This
evaluation would purportedly determine the subordinate’s pay-
ment for the experiment, whereas the superior would be paid a
fixed amount. After hearing about their role assignments, par-
ticipants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
The computer-based task was the two-back task. Participants
were told they would first complete the task separately to provide
an accurate baseline measure of team performance and would
then work on the task interactively with their partner. In reality,
they completed the two-back task only once, and their perfor-
mance served as our dependent measure.
In the two-back task, participants viewed a series of black
letters presented in the center of a white screen. Each letter was
presented for 500 ms and followed by a blank screen for 2,000
ms before the next letter appeared automatically. Participants
were instructed to indicate, as quickly and accurately as pos-
sible, whether each letter matched the letter shown two trials
previously (target trials) or did not match that letter (nontarget
trials).
Participants first completed 20 practice trials (7 target and 13
nontarget trials) with accuracy feedback. The actual task con-
sisted of 120 trials without feedback and was divided into four
blocks of 10 target and 20 nontarget trials.
After completing the task, participants answered questions
about how powerful they were relative to their partner during the
experiment, howmuch effort they put into the two-back task, and
how they perceived their performance. Finally, participants
were probed for suspicion and debriefed.
Results
Low-power participants perceived that they had less relative
power (M 5 1.02, SD 5 1.98) than high-power participants
did (M5 2.30, SD5 1.49), F(1, 93)5 84.48, p < .001, prep >
.99,Zp
2 ¼ :48.1 Low- and high-power participants did not differ
in affect, effort, or perceived performance on the two-back task,
ps > .22, preps < .70.
2
Our measures of accuracy3 in the two-back task were error
rate (e.g., Friedman&Fo¨rster, 2005) and d0 (e.g., Gray&Braver,
2002). The latter was calculated using the log-linear approach
1No effects of gender were found either in this experiment or in the other two
experiments (3 and 4) in which the number of males per cell was sufficient for
analyses to assess gender effects.
2Affect, effort, and perceived performance did not explain the effect of power
on executive functioning in any of the experiments.
3In all four experiments, power condition did not affect response latencies for
executive-function tasks. Furthermore, the significant effects on the main de-
pendent variables remained when analyses controlled for response latencies.
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(Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) so that participants with hit or false
alarm rates of 0 or 1 could be included in analyses. Analyses
were based on trials in which participants responded (Wacker,
Chavanon, & Stemmler, 2006). Low-power participants had
a higher error rate (M 5 0.09, SD 5 0.05) than high-power
participants (M5 0.07, SD 5 0.04), F(1, 93) 5 4.90, p 5 .03,
prep5 .91, Zp
2 ¼ :05. Also, low-power participants’ sensitivity
(i.e., d0 scores;M5 2.68, SD5 0.59) was less than high-power
participants’ (M5 3.02, SD5 0.71), F(1, 93)5 6.50, p5 .01,
prep 5 .945, Zp
2 ¼ :07.
Thus, participants in a low-power role performed worse on a
two-back task, a standard measure of updating, than partici-
pants in a high-power role. Although these results support our
hypothesis, the power manipulation allows for an alternative
explanation: Low-power participants may have been preoccu-
pied with their impending evaluation, and this concern might
have driven our results. To address this potential confound, we
manipulated power via priming in the remainder of our experi-
ments. Priming power has been shown to evoke a sense of power
and has produced results similar to those obtained with actual
role assignments (Galinsky et al., 2003).
Additionally, it may have been the case that the high-power
role improved participants’ executive function (Smith & Trope,
2006), rather than that the low-power role impaired participants’
executive function. Because Experiment 1 used only low- and
high-power conditions, we could not be certain of the direction
of the effects. The remaining experiments included a control
condition to resolve this ambiguity.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 examined the effect of power on the executive
function of inhibition. Inhibition involves suppressing unwanted
or irrelevant responses that may interfere with a present goal.We
used a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) to assess inhibition because
this task requires that one maintain the goal of naming the colors
of words while inhibiting the prepotent tendency to read the
words (MacLeod, 1991). We predicted that low-power-primed
(LPP) participants would show more Stroop interference than
both high-power-primed (HPP) participants and control par-
ticipants.
Method
Participants were 77 students from a Dutch university. They
received course credit or h3 for participating. Five participants
were dropped from analyses: 4 for extreme performance (more
than 3 standard deviations from themean) and 1 for not following
directions. Thus, data from 72 participants (65 females, 7 males)
were analyzed.
Participants first completed a 17-item scrambled-sentences
priming task (Smith & Trope, 2006). Each item consisted of a list
of five words, and participants had to use four of the words to
make a grammatically correct sentence. For LPP participants, 9
items contained a word related to a lack of power (e.g., subor-
dinate, obey). For HPP participants, those same 9 items con-
tained a word related to having power (e.g., authority, dominate).
In the control condition, all 17 items contained only power-ir-
relevant words. After the priming task, all participants com-
pleted a single-item mood measure.
In the Stroop task that followed, participants were instructed
to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether each
of a series of letter strings was written in red or blue ink. Par-
ticipants were instructed to ignore the meaning of the words and
to focus on the ink colors only. Each trial started with a 1-s
fixation asterisk in the center of the screen; a colored letter string
followed immediately. A 2-s blank screen appeared between
trials.
Participants first completed 10 practice trials, with accuracy
feedback after each trial. The actual task consisted of 120 trials
without feedback: 40 congruent trials (i.e., ‘‘RED’’ in red or
‘‘BLUE’’ in blue), 40 neutral trials (i.e., ‘‘XXXX’’ in red or blue),
and 40 incongruent trials (i.e., ‘‘RED’’ in blue or ‘‘BLUE’’ in
red). The order of the trials was random.
At the end of the experiment, participants were probed for
suspicion and debriefed.
Results
Stroop interference is typically assessed by contrasting perfor-
mance on incongruent trials with performance on neutral trials.
Error rates were entered into a 3 (power: low power, control, high
power)  2 (trial type: incongruent, neutral) mixed-model
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the second factor within
subjects (see Table 1). There was a robust Stroop effect: Par-
ticipants made more errors on incongruent trials than on neutral
trials, F(1, 69) 5 20.82, p < .001, prep > .99, Zp
2 ¼ :23. This
effect was moderated by a significant two-way interaction, F(2,
69)5 3.63, p5 .03, prep5 .91, Zp
2 ¼ :10. Power did not affect
performance on neutral trials, F< 1, but did affect performance
on incongruent trials, F(2, 69) 5 4.01, p 5 .02, prep 5 .91,
Zp
2 ¼ :10. LPP participants made more errors on incongru-
ent trials than either control or HPP participants did, ps < .04,
preps > .90; the latter two groups did not differ, p 5 .60,
TABLE 1
Mean Error Rates as a Function of Priming Condition and Trial
Type in Experiment 2
Priming condition
Trial type
Incongruent Neutral
M SD M SD
Low power .05 .05 .01 .02
Control .02 .04 .01 .02
High power .03 .03 .01 .03
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prep 5 .43. Thus, participants primed with low power showed
more difficulty with inhibition than did both participants primed
with high power and control participants.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 extended the results of the previous two experi-
ments by testing the more complex executive ability of planning.
Planning involves continuously switching between the main
goal and subgoals and thus requires regularly updating the
current goal focus and inhibiting currently irrelevant goals and
subgoals (cf. Miyake et al., 2000). We used the Tower of Hanoi
task, which involves moving an arrangement of disks from a start
position to a goal position in as few moves as possible (Goel &
Grafman, 1995). In some cases, it is functional to move disks
temporarily away from their final position; on such trials, optimal
performance requires noticing and then resolving conflict be-
tween the goal (i.e., to move disks toward their final position) and
the subgoal (i.e., to move disks temporarily away from their final
position). We used a version of the Tower of Hanoi task in which
trials vary in whether or not goal-subgoal conflict resolution is
required (Morris, Miotto, Feigenbaum, Bullock, & Polkey,
1997). We predicted that LPP participants would have more
difficulty in resolving goal-subgoal conflict than would HPP and
control participants. That is, LPP participants were expected to
require more moves to solve conflict trials than HPP and control
participants.
Method
Participants were 85 students (47 females, 38 males) from a
Dutch university. They received h5 for participating.
Participants started with a practice Tower of Hanoi trial. They
subsequently engaged in a writing task used to prime the ex-
perience of power (Galinsky et al., 2003). LPP participants
wrote about a time when someone had control over them, HPP
participants wrote about a time when they had control over other
people, and control participants wrote about what they had done
the day before. Afterward, all participants completed a single-
item mood measure, followed by the actual Tower of Hanoi task.
Finally, they indicated how powerless and in control they felt in
the situation described in the writing task,4 were probed for
suspicion, and were debriefed.
We used a computerized Tower of Hanoi task (Morris et al.,
1997). In each trial, participants saw two sets of disks and rods,
each consisting of three vertical rods and three different-sized
disks placed on the rods. Participants had to rearrange the
bottom set (the start position) so that it looked like the top set (the
goal position). They could move only one disk at a time and
could not place a larger disk on top of a smaller disk. Moving a
disk required two clicks of the computer mouse: one to select the
disk and one to indicate the rod to which it should be moved.
Participants worked on each trial until the bottom set of disks
and rods matched the top set.
In the actual Tower of Hanoi task, participants started with a
warm-up trial and then continued with four experimental trials.
For each trial, the computer counted the number of meaningful
clicks (i.e., clicks leading to the selection or movement of a disk)
and measured the time that passed before each click.
All trials could be solved in four moves, but the trials varied in
complexity. The first two trials were no-conflict trials, in which a
simple, effective strategy was to move the first disk immediately
in the direction of its final goal position. Thus, the subgoal (i.e.,
the first movement) was congruent with the overall goal of
moving the disk toward its final position. The last two trials were
conflict trials, in which the best strategy was tomove the first disk
in the direction opposite to its final goal position, thus producing
a goal-subgoal conflict. Adopting this complex strategy is par-
ticularly difficult after participants have become accustomed to
the simple strategy, so the no-conflict trials always preceded the
conflict trials (cf. Morris et al., 1997).
Results
Because each move required two clicks, we divided the number
of clicks by 2 to obtain a measure of the number of moves per
trial. We then subtracted 4, the minimum number of moves re-
quired. Thus, our dependent measure was the number of moves
above the minimum. Scores were entered into a 3 (power: low
power, control, high power) 2 (trial type: conflict, no-conflict)
mixed-model ANOVA, with the second factor within subjects
(see Table 2). The number of moves above the minimum was
higher for conflict trials (M 5 1.83, SD 5 3.20) than for no-
conflict trials (M5 0.89, SD5 1.43), F(1, 84)5 5.94, p5 .02,
prep5 .93, Zp
2 ¼ :07. This effect was qualified by a significant
two-way interaction, F(2, 82) 5 5.41, p 5 .006, prep 5 .96,
Zp
2 ¼ :12. Power affected performance on conflict trials, F(1,
82) 5 3.10, p 5 .05, prep 5 .88, Zp
2 ¼ :07, with LPP partici-
pants taking more moves above the minimum than bothHPP and
control participants, ps < .05, preps > .89; the latter two groups
did not differ, p 5 .89, prep 5 .19. Unexpectedly, power also
affected performance on no-conflict trials, F(1, 82)5 5.12, p5
TABLE 2
Mean Number of Moves Above the Minimum as a Function of
Priming Condition and Trial Type in Experiment 3
Priming condition
Trial type
Conflict No-conflict
M SD M SD
Low power 3.00 4.21 0.48 0.69
Control 1.17 2.88 1.57 1.96
High power 1.28 1.77 0.66 1.184The power manipulation in the essay-writing task significantly affected how
much power and control participants reported feeling, ps < .03, preps > .93.
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.03, prep 5 .95, Zp
2 ¼ :11; however, this effect was driven by
control participants, who took more moves above the minimum
than both LPP participants, p 5 .003, prep 5 .97, and HPP
participants, p 5 .01, prep 5 .94. Critically, LPP and HPP par-
ticipants performed equally well on no-conflict trials, p 5 .63,
prep 5 .41.
EXPERIMENT 4
The previous three experiments provide consistent evidence
that powerlessness impairs executive functions (i.e., updating,
inhibiting) and performance on a complex executive task that
relies on those functions. Recent research suggests that exec-
utive dysfunctions often reflect a general problem with actively
maintaining a goal in working memory (Duncan et al., 1996).
During such goal neglect, individuals are unable to remain fo-
cused on and initiate their goals. This is most likely to occur
when no external cues are available to maintain the goal within
attentional focus (Jostmann & Koole, 2007; Kane & Engle,
2003).
Powerless individuals have been reported to show symptoms
of goal neglect. Compared with the powerful, the powerless
display less goal-directed information processing (Overbeck &
Park, 2006) and behavior (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote,
2007b) and are less likely to view other individuals through the
lens of current goals (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, in
press). Thus, we hypothesized that lack of power impairs exec-
utive functioning because of goal neglect.
Experiment 4 tested this hypothesis using Kane and Engle’s
(2003) adaptation of the Stroop paradigm. Participants com-
pleted either a no-congruent or a majority-congruent Stroop
task. During congruent trials in a Stroop task, participants can
answer correctly by simply reading the word, and thus can ne-
glect the goal of identifying the ink color. During incongruent
trials, however, they must maintain the ink-color goal in order to
answer correctly. That is, it is only in the incongruent trials that
participants must perform an executive task because it is only in
those trials that they must override a prepotent response. In the
no-congruent Stroop task, almost all trials are incongruent; the
high number of incongruent trials implies that participants must
almost always inhibit their prepotent response to answer cor-
rectly. Thus, their own behavior continuously prompts and
maintains the task goal. In contrast, the high number of con-
gruent trials in the majority-congruent Stroop task means that
the task goal is not regularly prompted, so participants must
perform the executive tasks of remembering, initiating, and
acting on that goal. Thus, performance on the majority-con-
gruent Stroop task (in terms of interference scores) relies pre-
dominantly on the general executive ability of maintaining the
task goal, whereas performance on the no-congruent Stroop task
relies only on the specific executive function of inhibiting an
unintended response. We predicted that LPP participants would
show more Stroop interference than HPP and control partici-
pants in the majority-congruent Stroop task, but not in the no-
congruent task, because the former version relies more heavily
on attentional control.
Method
Participants
One hundred seventy-seven undergraduate students from a
Dutch university participated for course credit or h2. Six par-
ticipants were dropped from the analyses: 4 because of extreme
performance (more than 3 standard deviations from the mean)
and 2 because of computer problems. Thus, data from 171
participants (117 females, 54 males) were analyzed.
Procedure and Materials
Participants first completed a scrambled-sentences priming
task, as in Experiment 2. Then they answered 12 items that
assessed positive and negative approach- and avoidance-related
affect (Smith&Trope, 2006). Themoodmeasure was followed by
the Stroop task, which consisted of 12 practice trials and then
144 actual trials. Participants completed one of two Stroop
versions: no-congruent or majority-congruent. In the no-con-
gruent Stroop task, 24 neutral and 120 incongruent trials were
presented. In the majority-congruent Stroop task, 24 neutral, 24
incongruent, and 96 congruent trials were presented. To use the
same number of trials from each Stroop version, we analyzed
only 24 randomly selected incongruent trials from the no-con-
gruent Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 2003). At the end of the
experiment, participants were probed for suspicion and de-
briefed.
Results and Discussion
Stroop error rates were entered into a 3 (power: low power,
control, high power)  2 (Stroop version: no-congruent, major-
ity-congruent)  2 (trial type: incongruent, neutral) mixed-
model ANOVA, with the last factor within subjects (see Table 3).
A number of lower-order effects were qualified by the predicted
three-way interaction, F(2, 165) 5 3.14, p < .05, prep 5 .88,
Zp
2 ¼ :04. There were no significant effects for the no-con-
gruent Stroop task: Participants performed equally well on in-
congruent and neutral trials, F < 1, and this pattern was not
moderated by power, F < 1. As predicted, for the majority-
congruent Stroop task, there was a significant Trial Type 
Power interaction, F(2, 83) 5 4.90, p 5 .01, prep 5 .95,
Zp
2 ¼ :11. Power did not affect performance on neutral trials,
F< 1, but did affect performance on incongruent trials,F(2, 83)5
5.00, p5 .009, prep5 .95, Zp
2 ¼ :11. In the incongruent trials
of the majority-congruent Stroop task, LPP participants
made more mistakes than both control and HPP participants,
ps< .05, preps> .88; the latter two groups did not differ, p5 .30,
prep 5 .65.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across four experiments, low power consistently impaired ex-
ecutive functions. The robustness of the link between power-
lessness and impairment of executive functioning is demon-
strated by the fact that these effects occurred on three different
tasks, following three different manipulations of power. Partic-
ipants who were placed in low-power roles or primed with the
concept or experience of low power performed worse than other
participants on various executive-function tasks. The powerless
displayed impairments in the executive functions of inhibiting
and updating, and in the more complex executive activity of
planning. We proposed that these effects resulted from prone-
ness to goal neglect, a deficit in maintaining a goal in working
memory (Kane & Engle, 2003). Indeed, when the Stroop task
contained no congruent trials, making it easy for individuals to
maintain focus on the task goal, the effects of low power on
executive functions vanished.
Our results are consistent with recent theorizing (Keltner et
al., 2003) that individuals who lack power are guided by situ-
ational constraints and circumstances, rather than by their own
goals and values, and view themselves as the means for other
people’s goals. Our finding that low power diminishes people’s
executive functions is consistent with the powerless having less
goal focus than the powerful.
A lack of power is often said to reduce the efficacy of goal
pursuit because the powerless have fewer resources or less
motivation than the powerful. Instead, our research suggests that
what looks like motivational losses may be indicative of exec-
utive-function impairment. Our results cannot be attributed to
differences in motivation: Low-power, control, and high-power
participants reported putting similar effort into the tasks. Be-
cause low-power participants performed as well as high-power
participants in the no-congruent version of the Stroop task in
Experiment 4, the current research demonstrates that a lack of
power disrupts goal maintenance.
The current results have direct implications for management
and organizations. In many industries (e.g., health care, electric
power), errors can be costly, tipping the balance from life to
death. Increasing employees’ sense of power could lead to im-
proved executive functioning, decreasing the likelihood of cat-
astrophic errors. The performance deficits of the powerless in
the majority-congruent version of the Stroop task suggest that
such empowerment might be particularly vital when critical
situations are infrequent, making it difficult to maintain goal
focus (e.g., airport security screening, quality control in manu-
facturing).
The present research serves as a reminder that it is dangerous
to use the poor performance of low-power individuals, relative to
high-power individuals, as evidence that power has been allo-
cated on the basis of merit. As our research has demonstrated,
the social roles people inhabit can change their most basic
cognitive processes. In addition, our research sheds light on the
stability of social hierarchies. Because hierarchical rank fun-
damentally alters cognition, one’s initial position can lead to
behavior and performance that confirm one’s standing (e.g.,
Smith, Wigboldus, & Dijksterhuis, 2008). It is not just differ-
ences in inherent ability, motivation, or discrimination that lead
to separation between the haves and the have-nots; the cognitive
impairments associated with being powerless may also be an
important contributor, leading the powerless toward a destiny of
dispossession.
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